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ABSTRACT 
Controversial cases such as the aborted coup in Equatorial Guinea and the employment 
of private contractors in the Abu Ghraib prison have brought the proliferation of 
private ‘mercenaries’ to worldwide attention. However, the privatization of military 
security is more diverse and complex than generally suggested. Specifically, one needs 
to distinguish between the use of private mercenaries in developing countries and the 
privatization of military services in Europe. Focussing on the latter, this article 
proposes that the privatization of military services in industrialized countries can be 
understood in terms of a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. As a consequence, 
the emergence of a private military industry in Europe is not only characterised by 
distinct forms of governance failure, also have European governments developed new 
modes of governance to control the industry. Using the United Kingdom and Germany 
as examples, this article examines two modes in particular: public private partnerships 
and governmental regulation. 
 
 
The emergence of a private military service industry has attracted considerable 
academic and public attention in recent years. In particular, the controversial 
involvement of private mercenary companies such as Sandline International and 
Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and Angola and the proliferation of private 
security contractors in Iraq have spawned a growing literature on the privatization of 
security and its problems.
2
 The main the problems identified in these studies are 
challenges to state sovereignty, the militarization of societies, criminal activities such as 
trafficking in arms, and the lack of control, transparency and accountability with regard 
to these companies in particular when they deal with sensitive issue such as policing and 
interrogation. Most authors assert that these problems are due to a lack of national and 
international regulation of private military companies. 
 The aim of this article is to present a more differentiated perspective of the 
character of the private military industry and the governance of the sector. Specifically, 
it suggests that one needs to distinguish between the use of private [p.277] mercenaries 
by developing countries and the privatization of military services in Europe and North 
America. While so far most studies have tended to generalize the experiences with 
private military companies in the Third World, this article focuses on Europe. Two 
reasons support this focus. First, although the use of mercenaries in Africa has been best 
publicized, the large majority of private military companies are not only based on 
Europe and North America, but are also employed by governments in industrialized 
 countries. Second, while developing countries may be most threatened by the 
problems associated with the use of private military companies, governments in 
industrialized countries are best placed to regulate them. Third, the export of private 
military services such as strategic training to volatile destinations has direct security 
implications for Europe and North America. 
 Although this article concentrates on Europe, the use of private military 
companies by industrialized nations and the export of military services to Third World 
countries are thus closely linked and will both be examined in order to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the governance of the private military sector. As will be 
illustrated below, the relationships between private military companies and their 
Western home governments frequently contribute to shaping the corporate structure of 
these firms and thus influence their behavior at home as well as abroad. Similarly, 
European and North American regulations pertaining to the standards of national private 
military services are likely to increase the level of their provision overseas. The reverse 
holds also true. If demand for the regulation of military service exports to other 
countries increases due to controversial actions, this often also brings the control of 
national private military services in Europe and North America to public attention and 
on the political agenda. 
 In order to understand the nature of the private military industry in Europe and 
the mechanisms used by industrialized nations to control it, this article builds on the 
argument that the outsourcing of military services by European and North American 
states can be understood in terms of a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’.3 As a 
consequence, governments are developing new means for controlling the increasingly 
private provision of public services. This article uses the examples of the United 
Kingdom and Germany to analyze two governance mechanisms in particular: public 
private partnerships and governmental regulation. The first mechanism involves 
different types of commercial relations between public and private actors, including 
outsourcing, joint ventures, and state shareholdings in the defense sector. The second 
mechanism sets the legislative framework for the national provision of private military 
services and for their export overseas. The comparison between the two countries is 
particularly interesting because each has adopted a very different approach towards the 
governance of private military services. 
 Before one can turn to an analysis of the private military industry in Europe, it is 
necessary to clarify what is meant by ‘private military companies’. Typically, the 
literature distinguishes three categories: mercenary firms, private [p.278] military firms, 
and private security firms based on whether they provide combat services, military 
training and strategic advice, or logistics and technical support.
4
 However, most studies 
recognize that these categories are at best ideal-types and that many companies provide 
functions across these areas. 
 The analysis presented in this article, therefore, focuses on private military 
services rather than companies. It defines private military services as services directly 
related to the provision of national and international security which are offered by 
registered companies. These services can take a variety of forms from combat to 
military training, advice, and logistics. In Europe, and in this article, they are mainly 
confined to the latter. The definition also includes services provided by semi-private and 
  
government-owned firms if they take a company structure and operate under corporate 
law. It does not specifically focus on private policing is so far as it refers to the security 
of private persons and companies at the domestic level. For this reason, this article 
prefers the term ‘private military services’ over ‘private security services’ which is also 
used in reference to private policing.
5
 
 
 
Governance through Public Private Partnerships 
 
One of the most central mechanisms for the governance of the private military industry 
in Europe can be subsumed under the heading ‘public private partnerships’. The term 
includes a variety of arrangements which are defined by different relations between 
governments and private companies in the public service sector. Public private 
partnerships can range from the outsourcing of single functions or entire service sectors 
to joint ventures and fully government-owned private companies. Each type of public 
private partnership is associated with different forms and levels of governmental 
control. Whereas outsourcing provides supervision through commercial contracts, joint 
ventures and shareholdings directly involve governments in the provision of public 
services. 
 The following sections examine how the United Kingdom and Germany have 
employed different forms of public private partnerships to shape the outsourcing of 
military services. It shows that, although both countries have embraced the view that 
private companies are able to provide military support at better value for money than 
their national armed forces, they have adopted different positions on whether and how 
to control their emerging private military service industries. 
 
 
The United Kingdom: From Outsourcing to Private Finance Initiatives 
 
The outsourcing of military support services to private companies has been one of the 
most notable features of the reform and transformation of European militaries in the 
1990s. One of the frontrunners in this development has been the United Kingdom, 
where the Labour government under Tony Blair has [p.279] progressively expanded the 
role of private military companies in the provision of national and international security 
functions.  
  The British government has fostered the development of a private defense 
industry since the mid-1980s. At the time the Thatcher administration began with the 
privatization of the national armaments industry, including the British Aircraft 
Corporation, Royal Ordnance, Rolls Royce and the Royal Dockyards.
6
 Since then the 
New Labour government has further advanced the use of private companies with the 
outsourcing of a growing range of military services. While early projects introduced the 
private provision of non-military services such as support vehicles, the handling of 
equipment, and estate management, the scope of public private partnerships was soon 
extended to include contracts for the privatization military service functions. 
  One of the first steps has been the outsourcing of military training, such as the 
private sector provision of flight simulators and instructors for the Hawk Synthetic 
Training Facility in Anglesey in 1998.
7
 Another example has been the Medium Support 
Helicopter Aircraft Training Facility which provides initial and continuation training as 
well as mission rehearsal for the RAF’s fleet of Puma, Chinook and Merlin aircrews.8 
Since then the British Ministry of Defense has signed contracts with a multiplicity of 
private companies including for the training of pilots for the RAF’s attack helicopters, 
light aircraft, Lynx helicopters and Tornado fighter jets, of crewmen for the Navy’s 
ASTUTE class submarines, and of 16-17 year-old students at the Army’s Foundation 
College.
9
 
 Originally the majority of public private partnerships involved the outsourcing 
of military services to private companies. In particular, the ‘Competing for Quality’ 
initiative which was initiated during the 1990s ‘encompassed 160 areas of business, 
costing some 1.5 billion annually’ half of which were outsourced to private 
businesses.
10
 The British government has thus from the start adopted a market-oriented 
approach to the emerging private military service industry in the United Kingdom. The 
outsourcing of military functions to private firms has been designed to draw on the 
existing expertise of private businesses in producing services at maximum value for 
money. Governmental involvement in the privatized sector has been perceived as 
hindering this aim because it would restrict companies’ ability to operate according to 
market principles. Instead, officials were instructed to view private firms as partners 
which should have an equal input into how services are provided.
11
 Contracts have 
provided the primary means of governance in these schemes. However, while the 
exclusive reliance on contracts as a control mechanism seemed to be justified by the 
initially non-military character of privatized services, a number of developments have 
begun to change the nature of public private partnerships in recent years. 
 In particular Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs), which were originally announced 
as the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) ‘first choice method of funding new capital 
projects’12, have substantially transformed the relationship between [p.280] the public 
and the private sector in military affairs. Although the MoD has since the inception of 
the program become more careful with the use of PFIs and has established strict criteria 
for the evaluation of their economic and military suitability for individual projects, the 
MoD had signed 42 Private Finance Initiatives with a value of over £2bn by 2002 and 
was considering some 50 new projects with an estimated value of £12bn in September 
2003.
13
 Under the PFI scheme, the British government invites private companies to bid 
for not only for the servicing, but also the construction and maintenance of military 
facilities. Private companies finance these projects in return for military service 
contracts with the British government which typically last between ten and forty years 
and guarantee continuous income in the form of agreed fees. In addition, some projects 
allow companies to generate ‘third party revenue’ from the sale of spare capacities to 
private customers in the UK and abroad, although the contracts can include controls for 
sensitive destinations.  
 Notable about PFIs is that they influence the structure of the private defense 
sector. In particular, PFIs have facilitated the growth of the private military service 
industry in the UK. Moreover, since British PFIs require a prime contractor, i.e. a single 
  
company which signs the contract with the government, they have fostered close prime 
contractor-supplier relations and the creation of consortia specifically designed to 
compete for MoD projects.
14
 The PFI contract for the Medium Support Helicopter 
Aircraft Training Facility, for instance, is held by CVS Aircrew Training which is a 
consortium of CAE Electronics, Vega, and the outsourcing specialist Serco. Under the 
contract CAE designed, built, and operates the facility, while Vega supplies computer or 
internet-based training products, and Serco provides the training.
15
 Many of these 
consortia are not led by service companies, but by defense corporations which are thus 
entering the market for military services. In addition, defense corporations are 
increasingly bidding directly for training, maintenance, and servicing related to their 
equipment. 
 Another characteristic of the PFI program has been the growing range of 
functions which have been taken on by private contractors. While initially outsourcing 
was confined to non-military support and management, it is including more and more 
military functions such as logistics and training today. As a consequence, private 
support operations have moved progressively towards the front line. Although the 
British government maintains that there is a distinction between combat, which remains 
the prerogative of its national armed forces, and combat support, which may be 
delegated to private military companies, this distinction is weakening. In particular, the 
recent intervention in Iraq has challenged the notion that there is a clear line between 
armed forces which operate in the field and the employees of private military companies 
which will not become directly involved in military exchanges. The British MoD has, 
therefore, developed the idea of ‘Sponsored Reserves’. 
 The Sponsored Reserve concept, which was incorporated into British law in the 
Reserve Forces Act (Part V) in 1996, is designed to enable private companies [p.281] to 
provide military support services in conflict situations by enrolling parts of their 
workforces as voluntary ‘Sponsored Reservists’.16 These employees will become 
members of the Volunteer Reserve Forces and will receive training accordingly. The 
use of Sponsored Reserves is tightly regulated. When serving with the Armed Forces, 
they are subject to the Service Discipline Acts and Service regulations. Moreover, 
Sponsored Reserve employers have no right to appeal against a call out. As with other 
reserve forces, the maximum call-out period is nine months. However, for Sponsored 
Reserves the call-out period might be extended with the agreement of the reservist and 
the employer. So far, Sponsored Reserves have only been used in the Armed Forces 
Mobile Meteorological Unit.
17
 However, in a contract signed in December 2001 further 
Sponsored Reserves were agreed on for one third of the employees servicing the new 
Heavy Equipment Transporter. The contract will outsource the transport, deployment, 
and evacuation of tanks and other heavy vehicles in international crises. More 
Sponsored Reserves are planned as air and ground crew of the Future Strategic Tanker 
Aircraft for in-flight refueling, which will at £13bn be the most costly PFI project so 
far.
18
 
 With the Private Finance Initiatives, the British government is thus transforming 
the relationship between the public and private sector. Not only is the growing scope of 
private military services and the move towards the front line increasing the dependence 
of the MoD on private firms, prime contracting also facilitates the national and 
 transnational consolidation of the industry which contributes to reducing the 
competition among private companies.
19
 Moreover, PFIs with their long-term 
commitments of between ten and forty years place a heavy burden on the design and 
management of public-private contracts. Most contracts establish a close rapport 
between the MoD and the private sector companies. However, if this fails, the 
renegotiation of the initial terms of a contract can be rather expensive. Moreover, while 
minor reviews occur on average after five years, the majority of contracts include only 
one major review - usually at half term - which allows for the discontinuation of the 
arrangement. Since the PFIs mean that the ownership of military service facilities as 
well as technical expertise remains with private companies, the MoD may find it 
difficult to opt out of such contracts because it will lack the facilities and staff which 
could replace the private contractor in the short term. Most crucially, the terms of PFIs 
are not public. Finally, unlike governmental regulation, PFI contracts do not have to be 
approved by Parliament - neither, in fact, has the call-out of Sponsored Reserves. Thus, 
while contracts between the government and private military companies or Sponsored 
Reserves may give the executive some control, they lack transparency and offer only 
limited public accountability. 
 
 
Germany: Between Selective Privatization and Shareholdings 
 
In recent years many European countries have looked to the UK as a model for the 
outsourcing of military services and have embarked upon similar [p.282] measures.
20
 
Germany has taken steps towards the use of private companies through the reform of the 
Bundeswehr since the mid-1990s. The approach taken by the German government in the 
outsourcing of military services, however, has been quite distinct from that of the 
United Kingdom. Although the German government planned to introduce market 
principles into the Bundeswehr as early as 1994, it has been much more cautious in the 
outsourcing of military functions than the UK. Not only has privatization been slower, 
the German government also has tried to maintain direct control over military support 
services through full or partial government ownership. 
 The first steps towards the use market mechanisms were made in 1994 when the 
German Minister of Defense ordered for the entire military services to be redesigned 
and - ‘where appropriate’ - to be privatized. However, significant progress has only 
been made since the signing of the Framework Agreement ‘Innovation, Investment and 
Efficiency in the Bundeswehr’ between the Minister of Defense and representatives of 
the German economy on 15 December 1999.
21
 By 2003 nearly 700 private companies in 
Germany had signed up to the Framework Agreement which identified fourteen pilot 
projects for privatization ranging from information technology to military training and 
logistics.
22
 
 The projects envisaged under the Framework Agreement take the form of 
conventional outsourcing of military services to private companies. In these outsourcing 
schemes the Bundeswehr maintains the ownership of military assets, while private firms 
are taking over associated services such as management, operation, and training. 
However, only a limited number of pilot projects have been implemented successfully. 
  
They include private military support for the Army Combat Training Center 
(Gefechtsübungszentrum) Altmark and training for the Eurofigher aircraft. 
 In 2001 the first three-year € 75m contract for the Army Combat Training 
Center went to GÜZ-System-Management Ltd., a company owned in equal shares by 
STN Atlas Elektronik
23
, EADS/Dornier, and Diehl. The second contract from 2003 to 
2008 has been granted to Serco and SAAB Training Systems. Under the terms of the 
contract, the private contractors provide management, logistical support, facility 
maintenance, and technical support for training reviews and meetings. Military 
leadership and the training itself, however, have remained within the remit of the 
Bundeswehr.
24
 
 The Eurofighter project has involved the initial training by EADS Military 
Aircraft of pilots and ground crew, as well as the creation and management of a flight 
simulation center.
25
 As part of the former, EADS Military Aircraft provides ‘instruction 
using functional models, training sessions in the various simulators and active flight 
hours on the Eurofighter aircraft’.26 Unlike the outsourcing of flight training in the UK, 
however, EADS Military Aircraft has only been hired to train the first rounds of 
Luftwaffe pilots who will then become instructors for the German Air Force and replace 
the private contractors.[p.283] 
 In some aspects these two projects are comparable to the early outsourcing of 
military services in the United Kingdom. The main control mechanism in these public 
private partnerships are short-term contracts with private service providers. However, 
the relatively short duration of the contracts in comparison to similar projects in the UK 
presents a controlling factor which not only seeks to prevent long-term dependence of 
the Bundeswehr on a single service provider, but also can act as an enforcement 
mechanism because the continuation of the public private partnership is based on the 
satisfaction of the Bundeswehr. 
 Moreover, while these projects envisage the private provision of individual 
military services on the basis of case-by-case market testing assessments, the German 
government has taken a different approach with regard to the management of three core 
segments of the Bundeswehr: white fleet, clothing supplies, and information 
technology.
27
 To evaluate the options for public private partnerships in these and other 
areas, the German government created a private company, the Corporation for 
Development, Procurement and Operations (Gesellschaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung 
und Betrieb, GEBB), in 2000.
28
 
 Unlike the British MoD, the fully government-owned GEBB appears to have 
been keen to maintain a direct involvement in the provision of military services. While 
the GEBB admits that the outsourcing of the three core areas to private companies 
would achieve the highest possible efficiency, it has repeatedly made the case that 
privatization finds its limits where military services of ‘strategic relevance’ are 
concerned.
29
 In particular, the GEBB has argued that the German constitution requires 
that the Bundeswehr preserves a control and coordination function over the private 
provision of military services. 
 For the management of the white fleet the GEBB has, therefore, created the 
BwFuhrparkService company, a joint venture owned to 75.1 percent by the GEBB and 
to 24.9 percent by the Deutsche Bahn AG, the government-owned German train 
 company. The joint venture sufficiently takes into account the size and strategic 
importance of the white fleet by reserving strong intervention rights and options for the 
government. Specifically, the arrangement contractually safeguards the steering 
authority of the government and places representatives of the Bundeswehr on its board 
of chairmen.
30
 
 The provision of clothing supplies for the Bundeswehr by the LHBundeswehr 
Bekleidungsgesellschaft follows the same model, but with the greatest contribution of 
the private sector among the three core areas so far. In this case, the GEBB has set up a 
semi-privatized company with a government minority shareholdership of 25.1 percent. 
The remaining 74.9 percent are owned by a consortium of the German subsidiary of the 
American corporation Lion Apparel and the Osnabrück-based Hellmann Worldwide 
Logistics.
31
 
 The third sector, the IT provision of the German armed forces, is currently being 
investigated under the project name ‘HERKULES’. Given the sensitivity of IT for the 
Bundeswehr, the government is considering a similar corporate [p.284] setup, but with a 
significantly higher government share of 49.9 percent. Further public private 
partnerships and outsourcing projects are currently explored in the areas of food 
services, logistics, and training.
32
 
 In contrast to the United Kingdom, the German government is thus using 
corporate shareholding and joint ventures as mechanisms for the control of private 
military services. Rather than relying exclusively on contractual obligations, these 
public private partnerships enable the Bundeswehr to exert immediate control over these 
companies and determine how services are provided. This ability is crucial where, as the 
GEBB asserts, strategic concerns are more important than cost efficiency. Moreover, 
through governmental shareholding the Ministry of Defence becomes publicly 
accountable for the operation of private military services. In spite of its advantages, 
however, the governmental shareholder model as it has been developed by the GEBB 
has run into problems. Specifically, the Higher Superior Court of Düsseldorf has ruled 
on 30 April 2003 that even companies with a governmental minority ownership, such as 
the LHBw Bekleidungsgesellschaft, are subject to public procurement procedures.
33
 The 
ruling thereby eliminates one of the main cost reducing effects of government 
shareholdings and may result in pushing the Bundeswehr towards full privatization and 
conventional outsourcing. 
 
 
Governance through Regulation 
 
The preceding sections have illustrated how public private partnerships can be used to 
structure and steer the private military service sector in Europe. Nevertheless, public 
private partnerships are not always a sufficient mechanism for ensuring the 
transparency, accountability, and control of private military companies. In particular, 
when private military services are provided to non-governmental customers 
domestically or abroad there appear to be few safeguards. In particular, military service 
transfers are a contentious issue as shrinking relative defense budgets and the limited 
size of national defense markets in Europe have increased in the importance of exports 
  
during the 1990s. In the armaments sector this has been evident in the rising 
proportion of exports in most major European countries.
34
 So far no data is available on 
the export of private military services. However, in particular the UK government 
appears to expect that private military companies will achieve some cost-savings from 
the sale of excess capacities to third parties within the country or abroad. In addition to 
the spread of armaments and dual-use goods, the international community thus 
increasingly faces risks from the proliferation of military knowledge and expertise, 
including tactical advice and training, among non-state actors domestically and 
overseas. 
 In response to these threats, European governments have used national 
regulation as another governance mechanism to control their emerging private military 
industries. In particular, three sets of controls are relevant for the [p.285] private 
military industry: the regulation of private policing, the licensing of armaments and 
dual-use exports, and the regulation of mercenaries and private military companies. 
 The regulation of private policing is one area which potentially shapes the 
provision of private military services in Europe. Whether and to what degree it does so 
mostly depends on the definition of private policing or security services embraced by 
different countries and the scope of national regulation. A comparison of national 
legislation conducted by the European Confederation of Security Services (CoESS) 
shows significant differences.
35
 Some European countries, such as Denmark, Finland, 
France, Portugal and Spain, have strict and comprehensive controls. Others, such as 
Italy, have only narrowly defined regulations.
36
 Some countries have had laws 
controlling the private security services since the early 1980s. Whereas the United 
Kingdom and Ireland have for a long time favored a self-regulation of the sector and 
have introduced national legislation as late as 2001.
37
 With the growth of the industry, 
however, most governments have taken a more proactive approach towards the 
regulation of private policing and security services. This both, the United Kingdom and 
Germany have recently strengthened their controls. 
 The second set of regulations which have an impact on the private defense 
industry are national armaments and dual-use export controls. Although these controls 
have traditionally focused on equipment, in recent years there has been a growing 
recognition that non-proliferation policies need to be adapted to include services. Part of 
this development has been the licensing of the electronic transfer of sensitive 
technologies. In addition, the spread of small arms has given rise to strengthened 
controls on the trafficking and brokering of weapons. 
 Finally, the United Kingdom has been the first European government to 
investigate the possibility of regulating of mercenaries and private military companies. 
The process has led to the publication of a Green Paper ‘Private Military Companies: 
Options for Regulation’ in February 2002.38 However, so far the British government has 
failed to announce a timetable for the drafting and implementation of such controls. 
 Examining each set of regulations in the United Kingdom and Germany, the 
following analyses to what degree they allow both countries to control the domestic 
provision and the transfer of private military services. 
 
 
 The United Kingdom: High Profile, Less Punch 
 
At first sight the British government appears to have the broadest range of regulatory 
measures to supervise private military services at home and their export abroad. Not 
only has the United Kingdom regulations for private policing services, it has also 
recently expanded its controls for armaments, and it is considering the licensing of 
private military companies. Nevertheless, the high profile legislation which has been 
introduced by the New [p.286] Labour government seems to be less strict than controls 
which have been used by other European countries for some time. 
 Notably, the United Kingdom only introduced regulations for private policing 
services in May 2001. The Private Security Industry Act 2001 has set the basis for the 
governance of domestic private security services. However, by 2004 it was not yet fully 
implemented and therefore difficult to assess.
39
 The Act has established a Security 
Industry Authority (SIA) which has specified licensing criteria for door supervisors, 
wheel-clampers, security guards, and events security. It is still in the process of setting 
those for keyholders, private investigators, and security consultants. So far the criteria 
include a criminality check, although a previous conviction does not preclude a license 
but will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and basic training requirements of on 
average 30 hours.
40
 
 As far as private military services are concerned, the Act includes a number of 
regulations which may contribute to the governance of the sector. However, it needs to 
be noted that these regulations will only apply to services offered within the UK. As 
soon as a British company operates in another European Union member state, a 
different national law applies. In particular, the private military industry is affected by 
the vetting and training of security personnel falling under the categories ‘security 
guards’ and ‘security consultants’. However, the Private Security Industry Act fails to 
regulate services related to or personnel engaged in strategic training, military logistics, 
and management. The export of military services to customers overseas is also not 
covered by the legislation. 
 Potentially more effective controls over private military service exports have 
been included into the British legislation of armaments transfers which underwent a 
major review in 2002. The new British Export Control Act 2002 for the first time 
controls the provision of technical assistance abroad as well as the brokering and 
trafficking of arms.
41
 The Export Control Act 2002 replaces the Import, Export and 
Customs Powers (Defence) Act of 1939 and brings current British legislation in line 
with requirements of the European Union and international obligations. Specifically, the 
act implements the Statement of Principles on trafficking and brokering published in the 
Third Annual Review of the EU Code of Conduct on 11 December 2001
42
, and the 
European Joint Action of 22 June 2000 on the provision of technical assistance
43
. 
 Specifically, private military services fall under the specifications of the new 
Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical Assistance 
(Control) Order 2003 which prohibits ‘any technical support related to repairs, 
development, manufacture, assembly, testing, “use”, maintenance or any other technical 
service […] in connection with the development, production, handling, operation, 
maintenance, storage, detection, identification or dissemination of chemical, biological 
  
or nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or the development, 
production, maintenance or storage of missiles capable of delivering such weapons’ 
outside the European Community.
44
[p.287] 
 In addition, the services of private military companies are affected by the Trade 
in Goods (Control) Order 2003 and the Trade in Controlled Goods (Embargoed 
Destinations) Order 2004 which regulate trafficking and brokering of controlled goods 
to embargoed and non-embargoed destinations.
45
 The former prohibits UK persons or 
companies and persons in the UK from trafficking and brokering in ‘any restricted 
goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that his action or actions will, 
or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third 
country’.46 The latter requires that no UK person or company and person in the UK 
‘shall directly or indirectly (a) supply or deliver; (b) agree to supply or deliver; or (c) do 
any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of, any controlled goods to any 
person or place in an embargoed destination’.47 
 However, while the new controls affect some forms of private military services 
and prohibit trafficking and brokering of certain goods to embargoed destinations which 
is sometimes conducted by private security companies, the Export Control Act 2002 
does not explicitly concern itself with the regulation of the private military service 
industry. The main imperative for the extension of export controls to the transfer of 
military services such as technology and technical assistance is the growing perception 
of threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Consequently, 
the proposed regulations only require licensing if these services are linked to WMDs. 
The provision of technical assistance and technology related to conventional weapons 
generally remains unregulated. In addition, the current definition of ‘technical 
assistance’ does not mention military consulting and training. 
 The failure of the British Export Control Act 2002 to regulate the export of 
private military services is the more remarkable since the consultations about the act 
have been conducted parallel to the drafting of the British Green Paper ‘Private Military 
Companies: Options for Regulation’, its discussion in the Ninth Report of the House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and the subsequent response of the British 
government.
48
 
 The Green Paper, which is the first and so far only attempt by a European 
government to explore legislation on mercenaries and private military companies, lists a 
variety of options for their regulation, their advantages and disadvantages.
49
 
Specifically, the Green Paper examines three policy options: (1) a national and 
international ban on mercenary activity, (2) national licensing of private military 
companies and exports and (3) the self-regulation of the industry.  
 The first option would be the most effective, but is dismissed both by the Green 
Paper and the Foreign Affairs Committee Report on the grounds that it would be too 
difficult to enforce because of the problem of defining mercenary activities, because it 
would ‘deprive weak but legitimate governments of needed support’, and because it 
would deny British defence exporters legitimate business.
50
 
 The second option appears to be favored by both documents. The Green Paper 
specifically discusses the licensing of contracts for military and security [p.288] services 
abroad. It states that activities for which licenses were required might include 
 ‘recruitment and management of personnel, procurement and maintenance of 
equipment, advice, training, intelligence and logistical support as well as combat 
operations. [...] For services for which licenses were required, companies or individuals 
would apply for licenses in the same way as they do for licenses to export arms (though 
not necessarily to the same Government Department). Criteria for the export of services 
would be established on the same lines as those for exports of arms’.51 In addition, the 
Green Paper raises the possibility of a registration of private military companies, the 
notification of the government of contracts for which companies are bidding, and a 
general license for private military services to a specified list of countries.
52
 It seems 
most skeptic of the last option which it argues ‘would provide little protection for the 
public interest’.53 However, the Green Paper admits that a general license could be used 
in conjunction with other regulatory measures. 
 The Foreign Affairs Committee broadly follows this line by recommending that 
‘each contract for a military/security operation overseas should be subject to a separate 
licence, with the exception of companies engaged in the provision of non-continuous 
services for whom the Government considers a general licence would suffice’.54 
However, the Committee also supports that ‘private military and security companies be 
required to obtain a general licence before undertaking any permitted military/security 
activities overseas’.55 
 The third option of encouraging the self-regulation of the private security 
industry is considered insufficient in both documents because it would prevent the 
government from restraining private security companies which were acting contrary to 
British national interests abroad.
56
 
 However, while the British government has examined some of the options for 
the regulation of mercenaries and private military companies, so far no progress has 
been made on the drafting of these regulations. In fact, if the lengthy process which led 
to the regulation of the private security industry can serve as a model, British controls 
for private military services cannot be expected for some time. 
 In conclusion, the regulation of private military services in the United Kingdom 
has expanded, but remains fragmented and incoherent with different elements contained 
in a number of laws. Moreover, the failure of UK government to explore the 
implementation of the Green Paper following its publication appears to indicate a 
reluctance of the British government to fully exploit available governance mechanisms 
for the control of private military services. [p.289] 
 
 
Germany: Long Standing, Low Key 
 
The German government has regulated private policing and the export of armaments 
more consistently over the past and has also stronger controls than the United Kingdom. 
The government has thus a number of mechanisms at hand with which to further assert 
its existing influence over its private military sector. Private security and policing 
services have been regulated by the German Trade Code (Gewerbeordnung) since 1927 
as well as by special legislation for security services (Bewachungsgewerberecht) since 
1995.
57
 The Trade Code proscribes the assessment and licensing of service companies, 
  
whereas the regulations of private security services which have been strengthened 
most recently in 1999 and in 2002
58
, define further requirements such as training hours, 
a written and oral test on legal and other requirements, sufficient insurance and other 
obligations for private security personnel. As services, private military services are also 
regulated by the Trade Code. Moreover, the private security regulations specifically 
refer to private military services where they concern the protection of military facilities. 
 In addition, private military services are partially regulated by the German 
Export Control Order (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). Specifically, the recent extension 
of export controls to technical assistance for the development of weapons of mass 
destruction and, unlike in the UK, for goods with military end-uses in a country on the 
German country list ‘K’ or subject to a national or international embargo has direct 
implications for the provision of private military services abroad. According to the 
German export control regulations, ‘technical assistance’ includes military services such 
as the repair, development, construction, montage, testing, maintenance, as well as 
teaching, training, and the supply of know-how. As in the UK, the restrictions apply to 
all German residents as well as to non-resident Germans.
59
 However, licenses for 
technical services in relation to weapons of mass destruction and military end-uses in 
embargoed countries are also required where the assistance is provided in oral form, 
such as consulting or training, inside the European Community.
60
 Finally, the German 
export control regulations demand authorization for the trafficking and brokering of 
arms on the national control list ‘K’ or to countries subject to an embargo where 
conducted by German residents.
61
 
 In sum, the German regulations concerning private military services 
domestically and abroad are as fragmented as in the UK, but more comprehensive. In 
particular, the German law has a broader definition of ‘technical assistance’ which 
explicitly includes the provision of know-how. It also does not distinguish between 
private military services, such as the training of personnel operating military equipment 
in embargoed countries, being provided by German nationals abroad or by residents at 
training facilities within Germany. Moreover, the German controls apply to services 
related to WMDs as well as other controlled goods. However, unlike the UK the 
German government has for far failed to consider a specific law which [p.291] would 
combine and consolidate current regulations regarding private military services. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The preceding analysis has illustrated that European governments have a range of 
governance mechanisms at hand with which to control the growing private military 
service industry. Most of these mechanisms have a direct influence on the provision of 
military services not only in Europe, but also overseas. However, whether and how 
governments use these measures depends on their understanding of the dangers 
involved in the privatization of military functions and their willingness to inhibit the 
free operation of the market in the military service sector. Since there is often a 
perceived trade-off between the two, the question remains a political one. 
  This article has sought to show how this question has been resolved in the 
United Kingdom and Germany. The comparison is interesting because both countries 
have approached the governance of private military services in different ways. While 
the British government has placed considerable trust in the privatization of the sector 
and has only recently strengthened governmental regulation, the German administration 
has been careful to maintain its steering capabilities through public private 
shareholdership of key military functions and through stricter legislative controls. 
 Since both countries have only relatively recently expanded their use of private 
military services, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the different governance 
mechanisms adopted by the United Kingdom and Germany. Existing studies by the 
British National Auditing Office (NAO) and the US General Accounting Office as well 
as reports about Halliburton overcharging the United States government for services in 
Iraq indicate some problems with the reliance on contracts as a governance tool. These 
problems can range from loss of efficiency and lack of control, to insufficient 
transparency, and public accountability. The NAO, for instance, observed in its analysis 
of the British peacekeeping operation in Kosovo that inflexible contracts meant that the 
MoD had to pay damages for changing specifications and demands during the course of 
the operation.
62
 The American experience with more flexible agreements, such as the 
indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract with Brown and Root in the Balkans, 
showed that the company used its freedom to oversupply the army and set higher 
specifications than would have been required - at full cost to the Department of 
Defense.
63
 In addition, contractual governance can be criticized for its essentially 
nonpolitical nature. In particular, the contractual regulation of exports to sensitive 
destinations is not subject to parliamentary approval and thus lacks public transparency 
and accountability. 
 Regulation would be a more suitably mechanism for addressing these problems. 
However, current regulations are too young, fragmented, and [p.291] inconsistent to 
offer direct insights into the effectiveness of different types of national controls. 
Although the existing German controls surpass those of the United Kingdom regarding 
the sale of military services nationally and abroad, the prospective regulation of 
mercenaries in the UK might change this imbalance. 
 A positive outlook for the governance of the private military industry seems 
nevertheless justified by the observation that, as far as governmental regulation is 
concerned, the policies of the United Kingdom and Germany appear to have been 
converging over the past years. One explanation for this development is policy transfer 
due to the growing recognition of the dangers involved in the use of private military 
force at the national level and the export of private military services to third countries. 
After years in which the British government hoped for a successful self-regulation of 
private policing services, the failure of national service organizations to agree on and 
enforce common standards for the industry, the UK has thus turned to public regulation. 
In addition, the Sandline Affair, in which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was 
accused of having had knowledge of the illegal export of arms to Sierra Leone by the 
London-based private military company Sandline International, led the British 
government to reconsider its armaments export controls and investigate the possibility 
of regulations for mercenaries and private military companies. Another explanation is 
  
increasing pressure within the European Union to harmonize the regulation of private 
policing and military services in order to ease the transfer of services within the 
Community and to eliminate competitive disadvantages arising from differences in 
national export controls.
64
 Independently of the underlying reasons, the current scope 
and prospects for the regulations of private military services in Europe and the 
developing world appear better than commonly assumed. 
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